[elektro-etc] nuklearis eromu - reloaded

[Xorn]

A magyar iras szinte szo szerint ennek a forditasa. Melyiket ki irta akkor?

Best regards,
Andy

2010/10/21 Levente Móczó <levestelista at gmail.com>:
> Több dolog teljesen bizonyságos:
> Én nem értek a tórium reaktorokhoz.
> HZS legalább az alapjaival tisztában van.
> Ezért linkeltem az Ő írását.
> Valóban szkeptikus, igen.
> De legyen igazatok, legyen úgy, hogy nincs akadálya az ilyen (tórium,
> fúziós) erőművek megvalósításának.
> Mi kell az elinduláskhoz akkor?
> Elhatározás, és a beindításukhoz szükséges energia.
> Elhatározás a fasorban sincsen.
> A beindításukhoz szükséges energia ebben a pillanatban a rendelkezésünkre áll.
> Csak épp, ha ezt kivesszük a működő rendszerből, akkor azok, akiknek
> emiatt kevesebb jutott, roppant morcosak lesznek :)
>
>
> A lenti dokukat egy régi hozzászólásból ollóztam, előfordulhat, hogy
> vannak benne idejétmúlt dolgok:
> pp. 132-135 MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT: The Second Club of
> Rome Report, by Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel; E.P.
> Dutton, 1974:
> --------------
>
> Assume, as the technology optimists want us to, that in one
> hundred years all primary energy will be nuclear. Following
> historical patterns, and assuming a not unlikely quadrupling of
> population, we will need, to satisfy world energy requirements,
> 3000 "nuclear parks" each consisting of, say, eight
> fast-breeder reactors. The eight reactors, working at 40
> percent efficiency, will produce 40 million kilowatts of
> electricity collectively. Therefore, each of the 3000 nuclear
> parks will be converting primary nuclear power equivalent to
> 100 million kilowatts thermal. The largest nuclear reactors
> presently in operation convert about 1 million kilowatts
> (electric), but we will give progress the benefit of doubt and
> assume that our 24,000 worldwide reactors are capable of
> converting 5 million kilowatts each. In order to produce the
> world's energy in one hundred years, then, we will merely have
> to build, in each and every year between now and then, four
> reactors per week! And that figure does not take into account
> the lifespan of nuclear reactors. If our future nuclear
> reactors last an average of thirty years, we shall eventually
> have to build about two reactors per day simply to replace
> those that have worn out. The implications of such a
> development in the Developed World will be even more
> pronounced, as it is shown in the case of the United States in
> Fig. 10.1. ( By 2025, sole reliance on nuclear power would
> require more than 50 major nuclear installations, on the
> average, in every state in the union. )
>
> For the sake of this discussion, let us disregard whether this
> rate of construction is technically and organizationally
> feasible in view of the fact that, at present, the lead time
> for the construction of much smaller and simpler plants is
> seven to ten years. Let us also disregard the cost of about
> $2000 billion per year -- or 60 percent of the total world
> output of $3400 billion -- just to replace the worn-out
> reactors and the availability of the investment capital. We may
> as well also assume that we could find safe storage facilities
> for the discarded reactors and their irradiated accessory
> equipment, and also for the nuclear waste. Let us assume that
> technology has taken care of all these big problems, leaving us
> only a few trifles to deal with.
>
> In order to operate 24,000 breeder reactors, we would need to
> process and transport, every year, 15 million kilograms of
> plutonium-239, the core material of the Hiroshima atom bomb.
> (Only ten pounds of the element are needed to construct a
> bomb.) As long as it is not inhaled or otherwise introduced
> into the bloodstream of human beings, plutonium-239 can be
> safely handled without any significant radiological hazards.
> But if it is inhaled, ten micrograms * of plutonium-239 is
> likely to cause fatal lung cancer. A ball of plutonium the size
> of a grapefruit contains enough poison to kill nearly all the
> people living today. Moreover, plutonium-239 has a radioactive
> life of more than 24,000 years. Obviously, with so much
> plutonium on hand, there will be a tremendous problem of
> safeguarding the nuclear parks -- not one or two, but 3000 of
> them. And what about their location, national sovereignty, and
> jurisdiction? Can one country allow inadequate protection in a
> neighboring country, when the slightest mishap could poison
> adjacent lands and populations for thousands and thousands of
> years? And who is to decide what constitutes adequate
> protection, especially in the case of social turmoil, civil
> war, war between nations, or even only when a national leader
> comes down with a case of bad nerves. The lives of millions
> could easily be beholden to a single reckless and daring
> individual.
> ---------------
>
> http://dieoff.com/page155.htm :
>
> In June, France said it would scrap the highly controversial
> Superphenix nuclear fast-breeder, saying it was too costly and of
> doubtful value.
>
> Britain, the United States and Germany have already abandoned their
> programs for similar reasons.
>
> The state-owned Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp (PNC),
> the operator of Japan's fault-prone prototype fast- breeder reactor
> Monju, also came under criticism in the report for accidents and
> cover-ups.
>
> -------------------------
>
> http://www.feasta.org/documents/energy/nuclear_power.htm :
>
> There are three fastbreeder rectors in the
> world:
> Beloyarsk-3 in Russia, Monju in Japan and Ph´nix in France; Monju
> and Ph´nix have long been out of operation; Beloyarsk is still operating, but
> it has never bred. But let us look on the bright side of all this. Suppose
> that, with 30 years of intensive research and development, the world
> nuclear power industry could find a use for all the reactor-grade plutonium in
> existence, fabricate it into fuel rods and insert it into newly-built fast-
> breeder reactors - 80 of them, plus a few more, perhaps, to soak up some of
> the plutonium that is being produced by the ordinary reactors now in
> operation. So: they start breeding in 2035. But the process is not as fast as
> the name suggests ("fast" refers to the speeds needed at the subatomic
> level, rather than to the speed of the process). Forty years later, each breeder
> reactor would have bred enough plutonium to replace itself and to start up
> another one. By 2075, we would have 160 breeder reactors in place. And that
> is all we would have, because the ordinary, uranium-235-based reactors
> would by then be out of fuel.
> ...
> Thorium
>
> The other way of breeding fuel is to use thorium. Thorium is a
> metal found in most rocks and soils, and there are some rich ores bearing as
> much as 10 percent thorium oxide. The relevant isotope is the slightly
> radioactive thorium-232. It has a half-life three times that of the earth, so
> that makes it useless as a direct source of energy, but it can be used
> as the starting-point from which to breed an efficient nuclear fuel.
> Here's how:
> * Start by irradiating the thorium-232, using a start-up fuel -
> plutonium-239 will do. Thorium-232 is slightly fertile, and absorbs
> a neutron to become thorium 233.
> * The thorium-233, with a half-life of 22.2 minutes, decays to protactinium-233.
> * The protactinium-233, with a half-life of 27 days, decays into uranium-233.
> * The uranium-233 is highly fissile, and can be used not just as
> nuclear fuel, but as the start-up source of irradiation for a blanket
> of thorium-232, to keep the whole cycle going indefinitely. But, as is
> so often the case with nuclear power, it is not as good
> as it looks. The two-step sequence of plutonium breeding is, as we have
> seen, hard enough. The four-step sequence of thorium-breeding is worse. The
> uranium-233 which you get at the end of the process is contaminated with
> uranium-232 and with highlyradioactive thorium-228, both of which are neutron-
> emitters, reducing its effectiveness as a fuel; it also has the disadvantage
> that it can be used in nuclear weapons. The comparatively long
> half-life of protactinium-233 (27 days) makes for problems in the
> reactor, since substantial quantities linger on for up to a year. Some
> reactors -
> including Kakrapar-1 and -2 in India - have both achieved full power using
> some thorium in their operation, and it may well be that, if there is to
> be a very long-term future for nuclear fission, it will be thorium that
> drives it along. However, the full thorium breeding cycle, working on a scale
> which is largeenough and reliable-enough to be commercial, is a long way
> away.
>
> For the foreseeable future, its contribution will be tiny. This is
> because the cycle needs some source of neutrons to begin. Plutonium could
> provide this but (a) there isn't very much of it around; (b) what
> there is (especially if we are going to do what Lovelock urges) is
> going to
> be busy as the fuel for once-through reactors and/or or fast-breeder
> reactors, as explained above; and (c) it is advisable, wherever there is an
> alternative, to keep plutonium-239 and uranium-233 - an unpredictable and
> potentially incredibly dangerous mixture - as separate as possible. It follows
> that thorium reactors must breed their own start-up fuel from uranium-
> 233. The problem here is that there is practically no uranum-233 anywhere in
> the world, and the only way to get it is to start with (say) plutonium-
> 239 to get one reactor going. At the end of forty years, it will have bred
> enough uranium-233 both to get another reactor going, and to replace the
> fuel in the original reactor. So, as in the case of fastbreeders, we
> have an estimated 30 years before we can perfect the process enough to
> get
> it going on a commercial scale, followed by 40 years of breeding. Result: in
> 2075, we could have just two thorium reactors up and running.
>
>